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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
does expire on a date beyond the end of the ten-year prescriptive
period, the term of the servitude will be extended. 10
The drafters of the agreement in the principal case were well
aware of the latest expressions of the court holding that the
signing of a joint lease of itself would not serve to interrupt
prescription and attempted to establish a clear-cut interruption
by contract. The defendant Davis, being equally well advised,
struck out this clause, thereby showing a clear intention not to
allow the interruption of prescription.
The court said that if the defendant Davis had not struck
out this paragraph there would have been an express interrup-
tion, "and it is equally as obvious that the purposes and inten-
tion of these parties in striking out the provisions of this para-
graph was in effect to deny the interruption of prescription and
to refuse any acknowledgment thereof."
The instant case shows the hesitancy of the courts to allow
an interruption of prescription unless there is a clear intention
to do so. This seems to be a wise policy in view of the fact that
no new consideration need be given when there is an interruption
of prescription by acknowledgment.' 2
Arthur E. Sparling
OBLIGATIONS-EXCLUSIVE LISTING AGREEMENTS-
POTESTATIVE CONDITIONS
Under terms of an exclusive listing contract, defendant, an
owner of real estate, on December 7, 1949, listed for sale certain
property with plaintiffs, real estate brokers. Defendant agreed to
pay plaintiffs a commission whether the property was sold by
plaintiffs, by defendant or by any other person or persons. There-
after, about December 27, 1949, defendant requested the return
of his listing, advising plaintiffs that he no longer wished to sell
the property. The listing was surrendered with the understand-
ing that if defendant desired to sell the property within sixty
days he would relist the same with plaintiffs. The property was
nevertheless sold by defendant on January 6, 1950, to a purchaser
10. Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1 So. 2d 530 (1941) and White v.
Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So. 2d 433 (1942).
11. Placid Oil Co. v. George, 49 So. 2d 500, 505 (La. App. 1950).
12. For a discussion of this point, see Daggett, Mineral Rights in Loui-
siana 73-74 (1949).
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he procured by his own efforts. Plaintiffs claim the commission
is rightfully due them. Defendant filed an exception of no cause
and no right of action based on "the proposition that the contract
as alleged under plaintiffs' petition is purely potestative and
therefore not binding upon the defendant." The exception was
sustained by the district judge and plaintiffs' suit dismissed.
Plaintiffs appealed and the judgment was affirmed. Breard v.
Kanelos, 49 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 1950).
Where reciprocal obligations are exchanged and one of them
is found to be "null" because its performance is left solely to the
whim of the party who purports to assume it, the question con-
fronting the court is what effect this fact has on the obligation
assumed by the other party. When the conclusion is reached that
the other party's obligation is also unenforceable, the explanation
too frequently given in the cases is that the "contract" is potes-
tative.
In the instant case the court found from an examination of
the terms of the listing agreement that the brokers did not assume
any obligation.' In consequence, the listing agreement amounted
to an assumption of an obligation by the owner without any cor-
responding obligation being assumed by the brokers. The court
concluded that the owner was not bound by the listing contract
and explained "that the agreement must be regarded as potes-
tative." For authority the court cited Article 2034 of the Civil
Code which reads as follows:
"Every obligation is null, that has been contracted, on
a potestative condition, on the part of him who binds him-
self."
This article deals with the obligation, that is, with the promise
of one party, and not with the whole contract.2 What the codal
articles declare to be potestative is a condition,3 the performance
of which is within the option of a contracting party. And the code
provides that the obligation, the performance of which is left
1. One possible disiosition the court might have made of this case would
have been to imply a promise on the part of the brokers to make reasonable
efforts to secure a purchaser and hold the listing agreement to be a valid
bilateral contract. See Note, 18 Texas L. Rev. 334 (1940); Mechem, The Real
Estate Broker and his Commission, 6 Ill. L. Rev. 313 (1911); Hayes v. Clark,
95 Conn. 510, 111 Atl. 781 (1920).
2. Brown, Potestative Conditions and Illusory Promises, 5 Tulane L. Rev.
396, 400 (1931); Snellings, Cause and Consideration in Louisiana, 8 Tulane L.
Rev. 178, 207 (1934).
3. Arts. 2024, 2034, 2035, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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solely to the whim of the obligor, is null.4 Since the court found
that "no obligations were assumed or undertaken" by the brokers,
it seems apparent that the articles of the code dealing with
potestative conditions would not be applicable to the present case.
Since the listing agreement was potestative, the second agree-
ment also failed, its validity depending.upon that of the first.
The reasoning here seems to be that a contract is potestative
if one of the parties does not assume a binding obligation, since
in that situation the contract is lacking the "consideration" neces-
sary to support it, that is, a potestative contract is a contract
unsupported by "consideration." However, it must be remem-
bered that the only requirements for a valid contract in Louisiana
are set forth in Article 1779 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"Four requisites are necessary to the validity of a contract:
"1. Parties legally capable of contracting.
"2. Their consent legally given.
"3. A certain object, which forms the matter of agree-
ment.
"4. A lawful purpose."
The requirement of "consideration" in the common law sense
is significantly absent as a necessary element for the validity of
a Louisiana contract. 5 It is submitted that the civilian doctrine
of cause set forth in the Civil Code6 provides the correct solution
to the problem presented by th6 instant case and should have
claimed the court's attention. Since the code declares cause to be
the motive 7 for making the contract, it follows that whether the
owner's obligation ought to subsist depends upon the intentions
of the parties in entering the listing agreement.
If the owner intended to bind himself without receiving a
binding obligation in return, then the fact that no such promise
was received should not operate to release the owner of his own
undertaking.8 There is the possibility, at least, that the promise
4. Art. 2034, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. Brown, The Potestative Condition in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 23,
30 (1931); Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28
Yale L.J. 621 (1919).
6. Arts. 1893-1900, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. Arts. 1824, 1896, La. Civil Code of 1870. See Smith, A Refresher Course
in Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 2 (1951).
8. Mouton v. Noble, 1 La. Ann. 192 (1846).
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of the owner was in the nature of a continuing offer which he
intended to leave open for a period of time. If so, his promise
would be irrevocable for such reasonable time as from the terms
of the offer or from the circumstances of the case the owner may
be supposed to have intended to allow.
On the other hand, if the principal motive of the owner in
binding himself to this agreement was to obtain an obligation
from the brokers to make reasonable efforts to sell his property,
and they did not in fact bind themselves to do so, then it may be
said that the obligation of the owner was founded on a false
cause, 1 , or that his obligation was tacitly conditioned on the
receipt of a return promise that he did not get. Authority for
releasing the owner from 'his undertaking is found in Article
1893, which reads:
"An obligation without a cause, or with a false or unlaw-
ful cause, can have no effect."
If the owner entered into the listing contract and there
existed this mistake as to his principal motive it would follow
that the second agreement would not be binding on him, because
his principal motive for consenting to the second agreement was
the mistaken belief that the listing contract was binding.
As a practical matter it is extremely unlikely that an owner
of real estate would bind himself to pay a broker a sizable com-
mission, regardless of the identity of the person who procures
the buyer, without expecting from the broker a binding obliga-
tion to make reasonable efforts to sell the property.
It is important to note that no allegation was made in
plaintiffs' petition that they had made the slightest effort to pro-
cure a purchaser. The court conceded that had the brokers
"actually performed services under the contract" an enforce-
able agreement might have resulted. The court was merely recog-
nizing the proposition frequently appearing in Louisiana juris-
prudence that "a potestative condition that has been fulfilled
ceases to be potestative." 11 This is but another way of saying
that although a purported obligation to do something may not be
obligatory in fact, if the service is nevertheless rendered, the
9. Art. 1809, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Art. 1824, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. Oliver v. Home Service Ice Co., Inc., 161 So. 766 (La. App. 1935); Board
of Commissioners v. Concordia Abstract & Realty Co., 181 La. 373, 159 So. 588
(1935).
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recipient will have no cause for complaint. This means that if
the broker performs services under an exclusive listing contract,
the fact that he did not bind himself so to perform cannot be
relied upon by the owner as a basis for escaping his own obli-
gation.
This treatment of the exclusive listing contract is in keeping
with the majority view at common law, which holds that where
an agent has expended time, effort or money in attempting to
secure a purchaser, the owner of the real estate will be bound
by the listing agreement, for the consideration necessary to
support his promise has been supplied.'2
It may be conceded that from a practical viewpoint the deci-
sion in this case is sound. However, the reasoning employed by
the court in disposing of the issues involved is open to some
objection.
John C. Wagnon
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEATH BENEFITS-
PRIORITY OF CLAIMANTS
Decedent's mother and the nephew of his concubine claimed
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act as his
dependents. The mother was found to be partially dependent
and, in the absence of definite proof of greater contributions to
her support by the deceased, was given the statutory minimum.
Compensation to the nephew was resisted on the grounds that
the nephew was not decedent's child or a member of his family,
and, alternatively, that he was in a deferred class, whose claim
to compensation was dependent upon the absence of a member
of higher rank. Held, (1) the nephew was a wholly dependent
of decedent's family, and (2) the presence of a partial dependent
of a higher rank did not preclude compensation to a total depen-
dent of a lower rank, even if Sections 1231, 1232, 1251 and 1252
of the Workmen's Compensation Act establish .and rank classes.
Patin v. T. L. James & Company, Incorporated, 218 La. 949, 51
So. 2d 586 (1951).
The supreme court admitted that a reading of Section 1232
alone would lead to the conclusion that the minor was barred
from recovery. However, it held that the first sentence of Section
12. Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948), and the
cases there cited.
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